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This study examines the relationship between board of director characteristics and 
shareholder value. Moreover, this study also investigates the moderating role of family 
voting rights on the relationship between proportion of independent member on board 
and shareholder value. Based on 88 samples of Indonesian public listed companies for 
periods 2002 to 2005 (352 observations) and using random effect panel data analysis, 
the results showed that the proportion of independent member on board is positively 
significant associated with shareholder value. It means that the role of independent 
board director in advising and monitoring management to act in the best interest of 
shareholders is effective whether in developed or in developing market including 
Indonesia. Furthermore, while this study also found that lower proportion of family 
voting rights lead to strengthen the positive relationship between independent board 
and shareholder value.  
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
Husnan (2001) revealed that financial performance of Indonesian listed firms during Asian 
financial crisis was dropped not only in term of return on equity but also in term of return on 
assets (ROA). On the other hand shareholder value of some Indonesian listed companies is 
low. The percentage of Indonesian listed companies with Tobin-Q ratio less than 1.00 
increased from 23.72% in 1999 to 30.13% and 39.10% in 2000 and 2001 respectively. 
Asian Development Bank (ADB, 2000) and Claessens and Fan (2002) identified 
important factors that caused Asia economic crisis 1997 as weak corporate governance. It is 
the consequence of corporate governance characteristics of Indonesian public listed 
companies such as concentrate ownership and ineffectiveness of board of directors. Such 
perception motivate academics, media, government, corporations, institutional investors, 
auditing firms, etc to direct their attention an issues pertaining to good corporate governance 
as attempt to seek solution to enhance shareholders’ value. 
Corporate governance practices have been widely discussed in developed countries 
when managers in 1980’s were blamed for neglecting shareholders’ interest that marked with 
on going declining stock price (Toksal, 2004). In emerging markets, issues on corporate 
governance have captured considerable attention since 1997 when many of the Asian 
countries suffered from financial crisis that also impact to other emerging markets like Latin 
America and East European countries Over the years, institutions and researchers have 
conducted a number of surveys and studies on corporate governance practices as an attempt 
to analyze and understand the relationship between corporate governance practices and 
shareholder value. Different approaches and measurements have been used in various surveys 
and studies. 
In 2001 CLSA conducted a study on corporate governance from seven specific aspects 
i.e. disciplines, transparency, independence, accountability, responsibility, fairness, and 
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social responsibility. Questioners were sent to financial analyst, the rating of Indonesian 
companies varies from 13.9% to 64.9% in weighted average scores. In detail, Indonesian 
corporations obtained the lowest score in transparency, discipline, accountability, 
responsibility, and fairness among corporations among four Southeast Asian countries i.e. 
Indonesia, Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore. Moreover, the survey also demonstrated the score 
on aspect of country macro determinant of corporate governance, Indonesia received the 
lowest score in that aspect i.e. 2.9 score among 25 emerging market (CLSA, 2000). Factors 
that contribute to weak corporate governance of Indonesian firms are the firms’ individual 
governance structure and weaknesses of Indonesian regulatory enforcement. 
Anecdotal observation as well as some empirical studies indicated that governance 
structures of Indonesian corporations can be summarized as follows: firstly, highly 
concentrated ownership by family members, the ownership structures of Indonesian firms are 
concentrated on first and second largest ownership (Husnan, 2001) and the first largest 
ownership is dominant by family ownership (Classens, Djankov, and Lang, 2000), and family 
members are dominant persons in board of directors and commissioners (Tabalujan, 2002). 
Consequence of highly concentration and family based is little divorce between 
ownership and control, because majority ownership remains control the public companies. It 
is reasonable that conflict of interest in Indonesian corporations is not between shareholders 
and managers instead conflict of interest between majority and minority shareholders, 
because majority shareholders and board of directors tend to expropriate minority 
shareholders. Secondly, the stock market is not strong enough to control manager behavior. 
Market for corporate control or hostile takeover that is able to control or give an impact on 
managers’ behavior is not common in Indonesia. Although merger and acquisition 
transactions do occurred, most of the transactions are within family’s corporation or internal 
merger. Thirdly, legal protection for minority ownership is weak. Klapper and Love (2004) 
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showed that Indonesia is poor in legality, anti-director’ rights, and judicial efficiency. 
Fourthly, the role of bank to control management behavior is ineffective, because the 
affiliation companies have at least one bank that serves finance for group activities (Petrick, 
2002). 
As part of the effort to improve corporate governance practice of Indonesian 
corporation, government of Indonesia forms a national committee on corporate governance 
(NCCG). Forming this committee also aims to fulfill the requirement by International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) as stated in the new letter of intent. NCCG released Indonesian code 
on good corporate governance on April 2001. One of the objectives of the code is to 
maximize shareholder and firm value by enhancing transparency, accountability, reliability, 
responsibility, and fairness. In order to achieve its goal NCCG focuses on monitoring system 
for manager’s behavior by reforming composition of board of directors and board 
commissioners to have at least 20% independent member and formation of an audit 
committee. Its reforming is based on the argument that qualified independent members on 
board will be able to control managers and majority shareholders behavior effectively; 
therefore, minority right is protected. 
At present, most of the Indonesian companies have reformed their composition of 
independent members on board directors and commissioners to at least 20%. As a result, the 
percentage of companies with two or more family members on board has decreased from 
59.8% in 1997 to 40.7% in 2001, although they still represent the dominant influence ones in 
board composition (Tabalujan, 2002). 
Prior studies on appeared to provide mixed findings on the impact of corporate 
governance practice and firm performance and firm value. In particular, studies on specific 
corporate governance practice-firm value relationship can be grouped into two categories. 
Firstly, ownership structure-firm value relationship and secondly board structure firm value 
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relationship. Board structure-shareholder value relationship, studies were conducted in board 
composition and board size. For board composition, some studies showed positive 
relationship between outside directors and firm value. (see Bai, Liu, Lu, Song, & Zhang, 
2003: Hossain, Prevost, & Roa, 2001; Judge, Naoumova, & Koutzevol, 2003). The other 
researchers revealed that shareholder value is not related to proportion of outside directors 
(Bhagat & Black, 2000; Hermalin & Weisbach, 1991; Klein 1998; Weir & Laing 2001). 
Dalton et al (1998) conducted meta-analyses of some empirical studies with regard to the 
relationship between board composition and firm value He found little evidence with respect 
to the relationship between board composition and firm value. For board size, most studies 
showed negative relationship between board size and firm value (Eisenberg, Sundgren, & 
Wells 1998; Yermack 1996). 
In the context of Indonesia, studies on corporate governance-shareholder value 
relationship have been conducted by a number of researcher (for example Darmawati, 
Khomsiyah, & Rahayu, 2004; Lukviarman, 2004). Darmawati et al. (2004) examined the 
relationship between corporate governance perspective index and shareholder velue 
measured by Tobin-Q and return on asset (ROA). They found that corporate governance 
index is significantly related to ROA, but it is not significantly related to Tobin-Q. 
Lukviarman (2004) examined the relationship between ownership structures and owners’ 
involvement in board and shareholder value that measured by return on asset (ROA) and 
return on sales (ROS). By exploring ANOVA method, he found that ownership structure and 
owners’ involvement in board member are related to shareholder value. However, when he 
tested those relationships with multiple regression method, he only showed that owners’ 
involvement in managing board was positively influenced shareholder value.  
Mixed findings derived from prior studies with regards to the relationship between 
specific corporate governance and shareholder value reflect that further research efforts are 
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required to understand the phenomena in more specific manner and with greater details. Poor 
corporate governance and lack of transparency are perceived as the major factors that lead to 
1997 Asian crisis and caused poor performance and value determination to many Indonesian 
corporations. As attempt to improve corporate governance practice of Indonesian 
corporation, Indonesian regulatory authorities formed the NCCG after the Asian financial 
crisis. NCCG then issued the code of good corporate governance with the objective to 
maximize shareholder and firm value by enhancing transparency, accountability, reliability, 
responsibility, and fairness. These also caused institutional and foreigner emerged as the 
dominant shareholders beside family ownership. 
Despite the widely accepted perception that poor performance (both accounting and 
market performance) suffered by Indonesian companies during the financial crisis was the 
result of poor corporate governance, little empirical evidence have been provided to support 
such view. Based on earlier discussion on the unique characteristic of the governance 
structure of Indonesia companies as well as research findings from prior studies on the 
relationship between some corporate governance variables and shareholder value (see Bai, et 
al, 2003: Hermalin & Weisbach, 1991; Hossain, et al., 2001; Judge et al., 2003; McConnell & 
Servaes, 1990), Anecdotal evidence indicated that volatility of shareholder value among 
companies varied during the financial crisis periods (for example the stock price of some 
companies were able to rebounded in a short period of time, while certain companies took 
very long period to recover). 
Since board of director is important factors on corporate governance structure, by 
reforming board of director characteristics with increasing percentage of independent director 
will enhance corporate governance practice then affect to greater shareholder value. The 
study intends to examine the relationship between board characteristics and shareholder 
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value. This study will also examine the impact of family voting right on the relationship 
between board composition and firm value among Indonesian listed companies. 
 
2.  LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
2.1.  Shareholder Value 
It is widely accepted that objective of shareholders in profit-oriented organization is to 
maximize shareholders wealth. Shareholders wealth maximization in generally defined in 
term of stock price maximization, profit maximization, and firm value maximization is the 
purpose of founding of a company. To determine whether companies achieve their goal or 
not, the performance of the companies should be continuously evaluated. At least, there are 
two approaches that commonly employed in measuring firm performance i.e. financial 
accounting based measures (FAB) such as return on asset (ROA), return on equity (ROE), 
and return on sales (ROS), financial market based measures (FMB) such as stock return, 
market to book ratio, and Tobin-Q. 
Most studies on corporate governance-shareholder value relationship measured value 
by FMB i.e. Tobin-Q ratio and market to book value. However Pandey (2005) argued that the 
best measurement for shareholder value is market to book ratio. Wiwattanakantang (2001) 
argued that measures of performance that are commonly used in studies of developed 
countries (including Tobin-Q and market to book ratio) are not absolutely appropriate to be 
implemented in developing economies. Moreover, for the case of Tobin-Q and market to 
book ratio, she concluded that it is difficult to obtain the true stock price value in emerging 
markets, because the capital markets are illiquid and there is a lack of timely disclosure. In 
order to consider the best measurement for shareholder value (Pandey, 2005) and the illiquid 
and lack of timely disclosure problem in emerging market Indonesia including, we measure 




2.2.  Corporate Governance 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) stated that the agency problem arise when managers’ ownership 
is less than 100% as a result of divergent interest opportunism by the agent. The agency 
theory is generally underlying theoretical arguments for the adoption of corporate governance 
mechanism by organizations. Shareholders hire managers (the professional entrepreneurs) as 
agent in their firms to maximize their wealth, unfortunately managers are motivated to 
maximize themselves interest. As a result it is difficult for the financier to assure that their 
funds are not expropriated or wasted on unproductive project by managers (Shleifer and 
Vishny, 1997).  
Corporate governance mechanisms refer to the ways to deal with agency problems 
between managers and shareholders as well as between controlling and minority shareholders 
(Gibson, 2002). It aims to protect minority shareholders from the expropriation by managers 
and controlling shareholders (Mitton, 2002). Denis (2001) argued that corporate governance 
mechanisms should be able to narrow the gap between managers’ and shareholders’ interest 
and have important impact on firm value. 
According to Toksal (2004), corporate governance can be defined as a system by which 
corporations are directed and controlled. The control mechanism of managers’ behavior can 
be divided into internal and external mechanism. The internal mechanisms refer to 
management-discipline instruments which include voting rights, firm provision on 
management liability, representative supervisory boards, and incentive base compensation. 
On the other hand, the external mechanisms refer to market-based control such as 
equity, product, and managers market. Therefore ownership structure, board of director, audit 
committee, disclosure quality, legal system, takeover market, and product market are 
important elements of corporate governance mechanism.  In order to measure good corporate 
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governance, there are two approaches i.e. overall score and specific approaches. In overall 
score approach quality of corporate governance is measured by index of all attributes 
corporate governance. In contrast, specific approach measure corporate governance attribute 
individually. This study explores specific approach where this study measured corporate 
governance board structure. Specific corporate governance is very possible method to 
measure corporate governance practice of Indonesian listed firms, since some study difficult 
to obtain data of overall quality ( see CLSA, 2001; Darmawati et al. 2004; Khomsiyah, 2004; 
Nam and Nam, 2004), .The board structure in this study consists of three attributes i.e. board 
size (the number of board o commissioner), proportion independent member on board, and 
proportion of board of commissioner that has family relationship. 
 
 
2.3.  Board Characteristics and Shareholder Value 
Chiang (2005) argued that companies are facing dilemma to find optimum number of board 
members. Large board members will decrease efficiency due to process to achieving 
agreement among board members lead to be time consuming. On the other hand, small board 
members will decrease decision-making precision due to inadequate personnel to\ 
participation in discussions. Erickson, Park, Reising, and Shin (2004) reported the negative 
relationship between shareholder value and board of director size of Canada firms. Mak and 
Kusnadi (2004) found an inverse relationship between board size and shareholder value for 
firms’ Singapore and Malaysia. Hossain, et al. (2001) found negative relationship between 
board size and Tobin’s- Q ration in New Zealand. Yermack (1996) find an inverse 
association between board size and shareholder value in a sample of 452 large U.S. industrial 
corporations between 1984 and 1991. In contrast, Dehaene, De Vuyst, and Ooghe (2001) 
revealed positive association between board size and firm performance (return on asset and 
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return on equity) in Belgium. However, Eisenberg, et al. (1998) presented evidence that a 
negative correlation between board size and profitability extends to small firms with small 
boards in Finland. As no studies have been done in Indonesia related board size-shareholder 
value relationship, we refer to studies as mention above and free-rider problem to predict that 
increasing board size will be associated with decreasing shareholder value. 
H1: There is a negative relationship between board size and shareholder value 
 
Yeh and Woidtke (2005) concluded that boards which are linked to controlling families are 
associated with strong, negative entrenchment effect or greater agency problems, and firm 
with such board structures are valued less by investors. In contrast, boards that are 
independent of controlling families are associated with strong, positive incentive effect or 
lesser agency problems, and .firm with such board structures are valued more highly by 
investors. Lukviarman (2004) found that the performance of controlling shareholder 
involvement is better than the firms with controlling shareholders is not involve neither board 
of director nor board of commissioners. However, he did not test the proportion family 
member on board that can increase firm performance. In anecdotal evidence suggested that 
the professional managers are more productive than family members in Indonesia as election 
of family member on board of commissioners is not based professionalism. Therefore we 
predict that increasing proportion of family member on board will be associated with 
decrease shareholder value. 
H2: There is a negative relationship between proportion of family member board and 
shareholder value 
 
The role of board director is to advise and monitor management to act in the best interest of 
shareholders. Erickson, et al. (2004) reported that a negative relationship between 
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shareholder value and the proportion of outside directors in Canada. Bai, et al. (2003) and 
Judge, et al. (2003) showed negative impact of executive director chairperson on shareholder 
value, but outside director on board enhances shareholder value. Hossain et al (2001) showed 
positive association between outside director and firm value, but the relationship between 
CEO as chairperson of board and Tobin’s Q is not significant. Vafaes and Theodorou (1998) 
revealed that percentage of outside director does not relate to shareholder value. In Indonesia, 
it is a common practice to placed professional person such as academician or lecturer, 
economic analyst, capital market analyst as independent director. It is expected that their 
professionalism will increase an effective monitoring system of managers’ behavior, in turn 
thus will increase firm value. Therefore we predict that increasing proportion of independent 
members on board will be associated with increase shareholder value. 
H3: There is a positive relationship between proportion of independent board and 
shareholder value. 
 
Independent board of directors will work based on their professionalism since there is no 
other parties that puss them to something which not relevant to their knowledge. In addition 
professionalism of independent board depends on the selection process of board arrangement. 
In context of Indonesia, board of director is selected by shareholder in annually general 
meeting. In this process, dominant ownership actively involve in determining who are elected 
as the board members. Even though the independent members on board hope fully maintain 
the minority shareholder wealth, they not perform well when a family is the dominant 
ownership. 
H4: The positive relationship between proportion of independent board and 




3.  RESEARCH METHOD 
3.1. Variables Definition and Measurement 
3.1.1.  Dependent variable 
The dependent variable of this study is shareholder value (SV) that measured by average 
market book value (AMTB), According to Pandey (2005), the formulation to calculate 
AMTB is: 
AMTBit = MVCSit/BVEit      (1) 
 
Where: 
MVCS it = the market value of common stock shares of firm i, year t 
BVE it = the book value of equity of firm i, year t. 
The difference measurement AMTB in this study and Pandey (2005) is in calculation of 
market value. Market value of common stock in this study is equal to outstanding common 
stock multiple with average of three moths stock price i.e. stock price at april 1st to june 30th 
of the year after the end of accounting period. 
 
3.1.2. Independent Variable 
Independent variables of this study consist of board size, family members on board, and 
independent chairperson of board. Board size is total number of members on board of 
directors and commissioners. Family member on board is total number of member on board 
of director and commissioners who are family. Independent members on boards are total 
number of independent member on board of director and commissioners who are independent 






3.1.3.  Moderating Variable 
The moderating variable in this study is family voting right. Family voting right is the 
proportion of voting right that held by one family. This study adopts methodology developed 
by Claessens et al., (2000) to determine family voting right. Claessens et al., (2000) differed 
between corporate ownership related cash-flow right and control related to voting rights. In 
addition they argued that pyramiding and cross-holding cause different in ownership and 
control rights. To determine ultimate voting rights of one family we sum up that voting right 
by tracing pyramidal and cross-holding chains individually. For example if a family owns 
10% shares of firm P that owns 15% shares firm Q and the same family owns 20% shares of 
firm R that owns 5% shares of firm Q. The proportion of voting rights of this family in firm 
Q 20% (min (10% ; 15%) + min (20% ; 5%)). 
 
3.1.4.  Control Variable 
Previous studies showed that some non corporate governance structure variables are 
significant related to shareholder value (see Carter et al., 2002; Douma et al., 2002; Faccio & 
Lasfer, 1999; Ho & Wong, 2001, Klopper & Love, 2004). Therefore to better examine the 
relationship between board structure and shareholder value, we put two control variables 
namely firm size and leverage ratio. Proxy for firm in this study is natural logarithm of total 
asset. Meanwhile, leverage is the total liabilities divided by total book value of equities. 
 
3.2.  Population and Sample Selection 
Population in this study is companies that listed in Jakarta stock exchange (JSX). Sample will 
be selected base on following criteria: 
1. The companies were not classified as banking and financial industry, because of different 
characteristics and government regulated 
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2. The companies have issued annual report that ending period is December, 31st. 
3. The companies have information about board of director, board of commissioner 
composition, and ownership structure in their annual report. 
4. The companies have not been de-listed during observation periods i.e. 2002 to 2005 
5. The companies have a positive equity balance. 
 
3.3.  Data Sources 
Data used in this study will consist of four years observation of selected Indonesian listed 
firms in Indonesia Stock Exchange (IDX) between 2002 and 2005. Data required in this 
study are stock prices, book value of asset, outstanding stock, book value of debt, ownership 
structure, and board composition. The data can be obtained from Indonesian capital market 
directory (ICMD), companies’ annual report, and data base of accounting development centre 
of Gadjah Mada University (PPA-UGM). 
 
3.4.  Data Analysis 
Börsch-Supan and Köke (2000) argued that endogeneity, missing variables, sample 
selectivity, and variable measurement error, are econometric problems of many previous 
studies that will be caused the bias and inconsistent results on impact of corporate 
governance board structure included on shareholder value. They suggested that the 
endogenously of independent variables is generally occurred in two forms i.e. structural 
reverse causality and unobserved firm heterogeneity. They can be solved by using panel data 
analysis. Therefore, this study will test hypothesis by panel data analysis method. In addition 
this study will also explore non linear method if theory suggests that particular variables are 
not linear influence on firm value. 
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As Baron and Kenny (1986), this study will also explore hierarchical regression model as 
follow: 
 SV   = β0 + β1%FMO + β2Firmsize + β3LEV + e ……...(model 1) 
 SV   = α0 + α1%FMO + α2BS + α3%IB + α4%FB + α5Firmsize + α6LEV + 
e……………………………………………………………...(model 2) 
 SV   = Ω0 + Ω1%FMO + Ω2BS + Ω3%IB + Ω4%FB + Ω5BSxFMO + Ω6%IBxFMO + 
Ω7%FBxFMO + Ω8Firmsize+ α9LEV + e…...(model 3) 
Where; 
SV: shareholder value measured by average market to book ratio 
%FMO: percentage voting right held by one family 
BS: number of board of commissioners 
%IB: percentage of independent members on board of commissioners 
%FB: percentage of independent members on board of commissioners 
Control variable: 
Firm size: natural logarithm of total asset 
LEV: total liabilities to total equity ratio 
 
4.  EMPIRICAL RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
4.1.  Descriptive Statistics 
Table 1 showed that an average value of total asset is 2,174.28 billion rupiah. The smallest 
firm that included in this study has the total asset value of 18.86 billion rupiah and the total 
asset of largest firm is 46,986 billion rupiah. So this study focuses on the large firms and 
small firms as well. Meanwhile, the mean of leverage ratio (liabilities to total equity) is 2.19 




The mean of board size is 4.43 and the number range between 2 persons as smallest and 
13 persons as largest of this board size. The mean percentage of independent members on 
board of directors is 38% with the range from the highest 71% and the lowest 20%. This 
indicated that all Indonesian public listed companies have complained to NCCG regulation 
(the minimum independent members on board is 20%), but there some companies have no 
complained to Jakarta stock exchange regulation (the minimum independent members on 
board is 33%). The average family member on board of directors is 9% with the range from 
the highest 67% and the lowest 0%. This finding consistent with Tabalujan (2001) who stated 
that after financial crisis the average family members on board was decreased. The mean of 
voting right held by family is 43% with minimum and maximum right is 0% and 94.14% 
respectively 
For the periods of study, the mean of AMTB is 1.41 with the range from the highest 
14.91 to the lowest 0.10. This indicated that on average shareholder value is created even 
some companies created higher shareholders value where book value of shares is lowers than 
market value of shares. However, there were some of Indonesian public listed companies that 













Descriptive statistics of variables 
This table presen t descriptive statistics of 8 8 (352 total panel balanced observation s) Jakarta stock e xchange 
listed firms during 2002 to 2005. Total asset is the total asset of the company at December 31st for each year of 
research periods. Leverage is total liabilities divided by total equity. Family voting right (FMO) is the total 
voting right held by one family. Board size (BS) is the size of board of commissioners. Independent board is the 
percentage of the board of commissioners is made up independent commissioners. Family board is the 
percentage of board of commissioners that have family relationship. AMTB is the number of outstanding shares 
time average stock price during 3 months (April 1st to June 30th next year) divided by book value of equity. 
Statistical significant at the 1percent level are denoted by *** 
Variable  Minimum  Maximum  Mean  Std. Dev 
Total asset 11.86 46986.00 2174.28 5232.34 
Leverage 0.02 54.75 2.19 5.02 
FMO 0.00 94.14 43.00 28.11 
BS 2.00 13.00 4.43 2.08 
IB 0.20 0.71 0.38 0.10 
FB 0.00 0.67 0.09 0.19 
AMTB 0.10 14.91 1.41 1.82 
 
4.2.  Correlation Matrix 
4.2.1.  Correlation between independent variables 
Firstly, this study analyzed the correlation among independent variables in order to detect 
multicolinearity problem. Hair, Black, Babin, Anderson, and Tatham (2006) stated that 
multicolinearity problem occurs since the correlation among independent variables is 0.90 
and higher. Table 2 presents the correlation matrix among independent variables. FMO is 
negatively significant correlated to IB (r = -0.24, p value<0.01), but it is positively significant 
related to FB (r = 0.40, p value < 0.01). Meanwhile, BS is negatively significant related to FB 
(r = -0.12, p value<0.05). The last IB is negatively significant associated with FB (r = - 0.28, 








Pearson correlation matrix among independent variables 
This table presen t Pearson correlation mat rix of 88 (352 to tal panel balanced o bservations) Jakar ta stock 
exchange listed firms during 2002 to 2005. Family voting right is the total voting right held by one family. Board 
size is the size of board of commissioners. Independent board is the percentage of the board of commissioners is 
made up independent commissioners. Family board is the percentage of board of commissioners that have family 
relationship. Statistical significant at the 1and 5 percent levels are denoted by *** and ** respectively. 
  FMO BS IB 
BS -0.24*** 1.00   
IB -0.24*** 0.04 1.00 
FB 0.40*** -0.12** -0.28** 
 
4.2.2. Correlation between independent and dependent variables 
Table 3 shows the correlation between dependent variables (AMTB) and independent 
variables and moderating variable (FMO, BS, IB, and FB). AMTB is positively significant 
associated with BS (r = 0.12, p value < 0.05), and IB (r = 0.21, p value < 0.05), but it is 
negatively significant related to FMO (r = -0.24, p value < 0.01). 
Table.3. 
Pearson correlation matrix between dependent and independent variables 
This table presen t Pearson correlation mat rix of 88 (352 to tal panel balanced o bservations) Jakar ta stock 
exchange listed firms during 2002 to 2005. AMTB is the number of outstanding shares time average stock price 
during 3 months (April 1st to June 30th next year) divided by book value of equity. Family voting right is the total 
voting right held by one family. Board size is the size of board of commissioners. Independent board is the 
percentage of the board of commissioners is made up independent commissioners. Family board is the 
percentage of board of commissioners that have family relationship. Statistical significant at the 1, 5, and 10 
percent levels are denoted by ***, **, and * respectively. 
    AMTB 
FMO   -0.24*** 
BS   0.12** 
IB   0.21** 
FB   -0.06 
 
 
4.3.  Hypothesis testing 
This section presents the testing hypothesis 1, 2, and 3. This study tests those hypotheses by 
employing the multivariate regression method. The regression was exploring average market 
19 
 
to book value as shareholder value measurement, the multiple regressions results figured that 
proportion independent members on board of directors is positively significant related to 
shareholder value. Hence, the hypothesis number 3 was supported, but hypothesis number 1 
and 2 were not supported. The explanation power of regression is 2.3%. The finding of this 
study consistence what previous study such as Bai, et al. (2003), Judge, et al. (2003), and 
Hossain et al (2001). 
 
Table 4 
Multivariate regression result 
This table present regression results of 88 (3 52 total panel balan ced observations) Ja karta stock exchang e 
listed firms during 2002 to 2005. cross-section random effects method was used in this study since observation 
periods (4 year) is lower than the number of cross-sectional observations. AMTB is the number of outstanding 
shares time average stock price during 3 months (April 1st to June 30th next year) divided by book value of equity. 
Family voting right is the total voting right held by one family. Firm size is natural logarithm of total asset. 
Leverage ratio (LEV) is total liabilities divided by total book value of equity. Meanwhile, statistical significant at 
the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels are denoted by ***, **, and * respectively. 
  Model 1 Model 2 
 
Model 3 
Independent Variables Coeff t-Stat Coeff t-Stat Coeff t-Stat 
CS     
0.102 1.286 
0.102 1.281 
IC     
3.895** 2.306 
3.893** 2.287 
FC     
0.162 0.181 
0.158 0.175 
LOG(TA) -0.005 -0.122 
    
-0.005 -0.130 
LEV -0.011 -0.862 
    
-0.011 -0.872 
R-squared 0.002   
0.021   
0.023   
Adjusted R-squared -0.004   
0.012   
0.009   
F-statistic 0.385   
2.464*   
1.620   
Prob(F-statistic) 0.681   
0.062   
0.154   
 
 
In context of moderating effect of family voting right, we tested it by employing 
hierarchical regression model (Baron and Kenny, 1986). Moderator variable (family voting 
right) determines under circumstances a significant relationship exists between proportion of 
independent board and average market to book value. The moderator effect of family voting 
20 
 
right represents the strength of the relationship between proportion of independent board of 
director and shareholder value. The relationship between proportion of board of director and 
shareholder value may be higher or lower by employing family voting right. 
 
Table 5 
Hierarchical regression result 
This table present regression results of 88 (3 52 total panel balan ced observations) Ja karta stock exchang e 
listed firms during 2002 to 2005. cross-section random effects method was used in this study since observation 
periods (4 year) is lower than the number of cross-sectional observations. AMTB is the number of outstanding 
shares time average stock price during 3 months (April 1st to June 30th next year) divided by book value of equity. 
Family voting right is the total voting right held by one family. Independent board (IB) is the percentage of the 
board of commissioners is made up independent commissioners. Family board is the percentage of board of 
commissioners that have family relationship. Firm size is natural logarithm of total asset. Leverage ratio (LEV) is 
total liabilities divided by total book value of equity Meanwhile, t-statistics are shown in parentheses and 
statistical significant at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels are denoted by ***, **, and * respectively. 
  Model 






























R-squared 0.018 0.030 0.053 
R-squared Change 0.018 0.012 0.023 
Adjusted R-squared 0.010 0.013 0.028 
F-statistic 2.160* 1.798* 2.129** 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.092 0.099 0.027 
 
Table 5 shows the result of linear regression analysis using hierarchical regression 
method. The relationship between the proportions of independent members on board of 
director is positively significant related to shareholder value (see model 1). On overall 1.8% 
of variation in shareholder value is explained by proportion of independent member on board 
and control variable size and leverage ratio at 10% confidence level. By employing family 
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voting right as a predictor (model 2), the explanation power of the proportion independent of 
board of director has increased to 3%. Then when family voting right was included as 
moderator variable (interaction family voting right-proportion independent board), the family 
voting right provides additional 2.3% explanation power (see model 3), The negative sign of 
coefficient moderator variable (interaction family voting right-proportion independent board) 
figures that the positive relationship between proportion of independent member on board 
and shareholder value is strong when the percentage of total voting right that held by one 
family is low. 
 
5.  IMPLICATION 
This study is important for its theoretical and practical contributions. Theoretical contribution 
of this study especially in international corporate governance perspective that comprises 
environmental and methodological perspectives In environmental perspective, this study will 
provide empirical evidences on corporate governance- shareholder value relationship of 
Indonesian listed firms that have unique corporate governance structure involve the 
regulation, family business group dominant, and different in board composition (unique 
twotier board). The result of this study showed that independent directors play an important 
role in order to enhancing shareholder value. This result is consistent with some previous 
studies such as Hossain et al (2001). This implies that the role of independent board director 
in advising and monitoring management to act in the best interest of shareholders is effective 
whether in developed or in developing market including Indonesia. Furthermore, this study 
also found the proportion of voting right held by a family affected the effectiveness of 
independent director in management monitoring process in order to enhance shareholder 
value. The lowest proportion of voting right held a family in an Indonesian public listed 
company; strengthen the positive relationship between independent board and shareholder 
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value. In context practical implication, this study gives significant input to Indonesian 
regulatory bodies especially to the capital market executive agency of Indonesia (BAPEPAM 
and NCCG in setting and evaluating corporate governance regulation especially in setting 
board structure, this study suggest that higher independent member on board will be followed 
by effectiveness of advising and monitoring function of board in order to make sure that 
management act in the best of shareholder interest. 
 
6.  LIMITATION AND SUGGESTION FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
The few limitations are identified in conducting this research that may be lead to unsupported 
two hypothesis of this study. Firstly, this study is limited by measurement percentages of 
family member on board which only focus on family relationship by name and information of 
board characteristics. This study is not tracing the family relationship of board by other 
sources, so sometime the real family relationship of board of director in Indonesian public 
listed companies can not be determined by the last name. We suggest future research can 
replicated this study by improving measurement of family relationship board. Second 
limitation of this study is in term of relative short period (4 year), it consequence is that this 
study can not employ fixed effect panel data analysis that has itself advantages and 
disadvantages. Future research can extend the period of observations, in order to find the 
smart result. Last but not list, the explanation power of this study is too low, it means that so 
many other variables mainly other corporate governance attributes such as audit committee 
and board meeting which can explain the variation of shareholder value had not included in 
this study. Therefore, future research should employ those variables for enhancing 





7.  CONCLUSION 
The objectives of this study are to examine the relationship between board of director 
structure and shareholder value and to investigate the effect of proportion of voting right held 
by a family to the relationship between proportion of independent member on board and 
shareholder value. Based on 88 samples of Indonesian public listed firm for periods 2002 to 
2005 (352 observations0 and using random effect panel data analysis, the results showed that 
the proportion of independent member on board is positively significant associated with 
shareholder value. This study also found that the positive significant relationship between 
proportion of independent director and shareholder value is strong when the proportion of 
voting right held by a family is low. Since the result of this study is consistent with some 
previous studies in developed market such as Hossain et al (2001), we concluded that the role 
of independent board director in advising and monitoring management to act in the best 
interest of shareholders is effective whether in developed or in developing market including 
Indonesia. Furthermore, while this study also found that lower proportion of voting right held 
a family in an Indonesian public listed company; strengthen the positive relationship between 
independent board and shareholder value; we also concluded the non family Indonesian 
public listed companies intent to hire the professional persons as independent director. 
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